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The paper examines the ways in which rationalities of risk currently work to produce the 
academic as a self-managing worker within the ‘post-welfare’ university as a risk-
conscious organisation. It explores how risk minimisation as audit (individual, 
departmental, organisational), engages all individuals within the university in doing 
particular sorts of work on themselves, the work of turning themselves into ‘professional 
experts’. The theme is developed drawing on Mary Douglas’s (1966, 1990) theorising of 
‘risk-as-danger’, Marilyn Strathern’s (1997) inquiry into the “audit explosion” in 
universities, Ericson and Haggerty’s (1997) work on knowledge and professionalism 
within the risk-conscious organisation, and Castel’s (1991) understanding of the changing 









I take as the starting point for this paper a statement made by Bill Tierney in a recent 
article on academic freedom (Tierney, 2001) and organisational identity within 
universities. He states: 
 
If deans and department heads… are seen exclusively as managers, a culture will be 
developed where academic freedom is irrelevant or may not even be discussed. We 
need to think of them more as symbolic analysts who tend to the interpretive side of 
the academic enterprise and ensure that the organisation’s culture remains true to 
basic academic ideals. (p.14)   
 
My purpose in this paper is to investigate what this statement is unable to say about the 
changing nature of the academic subject. Rather than proceeding from a binary 
formulation of managers as distinct from academics, I examine the ways in which 
rationalities of risk currently work to produce a particular sort of self-managing worker 
within the university as a risk-conscious organisation. My interest is in how risk 
minimisation as audit (individual, departmental, organisational), engages all individuals 
within the university (managers and non-managers) in doing particular sorts of work on 
themselves, the work of turning themselves into ‘professional experts’. The argument I 
attempt to flesh out is that risk minimisation is an organisational logic that requires all 
populations within the university (academics, managers, support staff) to develop 
themselves as risk-conscious individuals in order to do the work of the university as a 
risk-minimising organisation.     
In developing this theme, I draw on Mary Douglas’s (1966, 1990) theorising of ‘risk-as-
danger’, Marilyn Strathern’s (1997) inquiry into the “audit explosion” in universities, 
Ericson and Haggerty’s (1997) work on knowledge and professionalism within the risk-
conscious organisation, and Castel’s (1991) understanding of the changing practitioner-
client relationship. Following these theorists, I argue that, while it is certainly possible 
(indeed necessary) to differentiate particular roles within the university as an 
organisation, the notion that “basic academic ideals” exist in a pure space to be carried 
forward by a number of individuals who used to be academics but are now in 
management positions, is highly suspect, perhaps even unhelpful in thinking about the 
production of new subjectivities within the university.    
 
Universities as ‘risk organisations’  
All contemporary organisations, including universities, are risk organisations. This is 
because all organisations must, of necessity, focus on guarding themselves against the 
possibility of failure.  In her anthropological studies of social and cultural life, Mary 
Douglas argues that risk is no longer about the probability of losses and gains - risk 
simply means danger. She states: 
 
The modern risk concept, parsed now as danger, is invoked to protect individuals 
against encroachments of others. It is part of the system of thought that upholds the 
type of individualist culture which sustains an expanding industrial system. 
(Douglas, 1990: p.7)         
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Following Douglas, ‘risk-as-danger’, is generally understood by cultural theorists to serve 
the “forensic needs” (Douglas, 1990) of a new and expanding global culture in 
“politicizing and moralizing the links between dangers and approved behaviours” 
(Pidgeon et al, 1992: 113).  
 
Organizations in a “risk society” (Beck, 1992) must be alert to potential danger – the 
danger of not performing in ways that are morally and politically acceptable, as well as 
economically viable. As Beck (1992) argues it, risk society is characterized by negative 
logic, a shift away from the management and distribution of material/industrial “goods” 
to the management and distribution of “bads”, ie, the control of knowledge about danger, 
about what might go wrong and about the systems needed to guard against such a 
possibility.  
 
For a university, this means guarding against the danger of waste (of resources), of failure 
(of students), of declining standards (intellectual, ethical and moral). Academics 
worldwide would be aware of the fact that universities now have larger and more diverse 
populations of students and staff than ever before. According to a demographic study of 
university student populations in business schools in the USA (Coccari and Javalgi, 
1995), there has an increased enrolment of older students, and a greater variety of 
minority enrolments in recent years. A current study of doctoral programs in Australia 
(McWillliam et al, 2001) shows that there is a marked growth in non-traditional course 
offerings that seems to parallel the growth of non-traditional student populations at the 
postgraduate level. All of these non-traditional practices represent a form of danger for 
the university in terms of its any claims it might make about maintaining academic 
standards.  
 
Yet it is too easy to think that it is non-traditional populations and practices that are the 
‘cause’ of risk and the reason for its careful management.  The cultural theorizing of risk 
is a conceptual field which allows us to move beyond this somewhat simplistic thinking 
to investigate the ways that rationalities of risk can work as a logic for naming a 
particular set of practices as ‘risky’ and also for determining what sort of mechanisms 
ought to be put in place to minimize the now apparent danger.  
 
‘Soft marking’ is useful as a practical illustration of the work that is being done by new 
knowledge objects produced out of a discourse of risk. Using conceptual model of “the 
social amplification of risk” provided by Kasperson et al (1998), it becomes possible to 
understand how soft marking can be thinkable as a serious danger, and that this has 
particular effects on academics and their work. Working out of the assumption that the 
investigation of risk is both “a scientific activity and an expression of culture” (p.149), 
Kasperson et al fill a gap in risk research by explaining how an apparently minor risk 
might produce massive public reactions. They use the term “risk events” to describe 
“occurrences that are manifestations of the risk and that initiate signals pertaining to the 
risk” (p.150). A risk event is usually “specific to a particular time and location”, but 
comes to “interact with psychological, social and cultural processes” in ways that 
“heighten or attenuate public perceptions of risk and related risk behaviour” (p.150).  
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An allegation of soft marking, then, gains the status of a “risk event” if and when it 
interacts with other socio-cultural processes to produce behaviours that serve to increase 
the perceived danger, triggering demands for “additional organizational response and 
protective actions or impeding needed protective actions” (p.151). Such 
conceptualization points to the doubleness of the play of risk, as it loops back upon itself, 
thereby proliferating the actions and reactions that constitute its management.  
 
As a risk event, soft marking is neither a ‘true’ (absolute) nor a ‘distorted’ (socially 
determined) risk within universities. The term ‘soft marking’ is a knowledge object that 
has been invented, and then discovered to exist in universities as a mobiliser of a range of 
practices that are potentially dangerous. This is not to say that soft marking is entirely 
fictive – merely to argue that it is a term which arises at this point in history to make a 
particular kind of sense (about assessment processes) and so to do a particular kind of 
work in governing academic practices. As a knowledge object, soft marking works 
through a negative logic that mobilizes more efficient surveillance practices in 
universities which understandably fear negative attention from potential markets, 
governments, other funding bodies and the general community. When something happens 
that is alleged to be an instance of soft marking, a whole organizational culture is 
mobilised by the naming of this occurrence – it is now a risk event.     
 
Universities respond to the sort of danger that such allegations represent by heightening 
surveillance around a wide range of assessment practices, some of which may once have 
been regarded – and still would be defended - as positive discrimination in the service of 
social justice and equity. Thus examiners must work within a paradoxical set of demands 
– they must mark the work of ESL students with sensitivity to the cross-cultural demands 
of writing in English, but they must understand that the avoidance of ‘overly punitive’ 
marking can quickly mobilize its doppelganger, soft marking, in such a way as to call into 
question the standards of a particular organization or an entire sector.    
 
This questioning has certainly been observable in media depictions of the Australian 
higher education sector in recent times, with soft marking making attention-grabbing 
headlines in the national and regional newspapers. “Failed students make the grade” (The 
Courier Mail, 3 February, 2001, p.1), “Universities’ testing times” (The Advertiser, 10 
February, 2001, p.67), “Marking inquiry exposes glitches” (The Australian, 6 June, 2001, 
p.23), “Unis get poor marks for evaluation practices” (The Australian, 27 June, 2001, 
p.31) – all these headlines frame universities as guilty of suspicion of “perpetuating a 
fraud”  (The Courier Mail, 3 February, 2001 p.1) and thereby abusing the public trust 
which is made tangible in government funding.  
 
In the face of such allegations, universities move quickly to advertise their internal risk 
response activities, mitigating the possibility of the accusation of ‘lower standards’ 
through such tactics as seeking international accreditation through the OECD or similar 
bodies. So rationalities of risk continue to produce particular sorts of activity – 
administrative, relational, policy-driven, pedagogical, technological – directed towards 
minimizing danger.      
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In more generalized terms, then, the management of risk demands knowledge of risk, and 
knowledge of risk produces new risks for the organization and its personnel. As Ericson 
and Haggerty (1997) point out, the risk society is a knowledge society “because scientific 
knowledge and technologies are sources of major risks and the primary basis of security 
efforts aimed at controlling such risks” (p.88). In Beck’s (1992) terms, “the sources of 
danger are no longer ignorance but knowledge….Modernity has become the threat and 
the promise of emancipation of the threat that creates itself” (p.183). So knowledge about 
risk is no escape from danger. Indeed such knowledge is itself dangerous. It threatens all 
professionals because it gives them processes for deciding what action to take and at the 
same time provides the means by which they can be found to have done the wrong thing 
(Ericson and Haggerty, 1997: 89).  
 
Thus it is not simply that large populations of non-traditional clients have ‘caused’ a 
heightened vigilance in the university sector, just as it is not simply that the decline of the 
welfare state has ‘caused’ universities to become more accountable for the shrinking 
funding that they receive from governments, or that senior managers have ‘caused’ 
academics to spend more time in administration and less time in ‘real’ teaching. As 
necessary professional expertise, risk knowledge itself has within it the seeds of its own 





The ways in which danger is managed by universities around the world vary, with ‘post-
welfare’ universities such as the UK, Australia and New Zealand exhibiting more overt 
regulatory pressure from government than those in Europe or the USA. This reflects a 
shift in the positioning of government with respect to higher education, as governments 
move from being patrons of universities to being buyers of higher education services and 
products.  
 
Concerns about the capacities of Australian universities to self-manage around risk – its 
identification and its minimization - have been a theme of successive governments in 
recent times. They are made explicit in government bureaucrat Michael Gallagher’s 
(2000) summation of outcomes of discussions between the Australian Federal 
Government and senior university executives. He states that these discussions pointed to 
“a number of failures” (p.38) that he links to the “trial and error dimension” of university 
management practice to date. According to Gallagher, it is the lack of uniformity of 
practice within universities that is the key culprit in producing failure. “The next phase of 
development”, Gallagher concludes “…can be expected to be more formalized and 
professionally risk managed” (p.38). This finding is echoed in the Higher Education 
Management Review Committee in Australia (Hoare, Stanley, Kirkby and Coaldrake, 
1995) and in the Dearing Report (1997) in the United Kingdom. Both Committees 
foreground the failure of universities to develop the sort of management culture necessary 




Risk management as an organizational culture 
Central to the ‘negative’ logic of risk management, as indicated above, is the idea that 
there must be more self-scrutiny, regularity and control within and across an 
organizational sector. This is manifested in an “audit explosion” in universities as a 
defense against systemic arbitrariness (Strathern, 1997). Audit mechanisms are designed 
to ensure organizational precision for coping with (appropriate) social imprecision. Put 
simply, the logic is that systems of management need to be uniform because individuals 
are not, nor are likely to be. This logic of procedural equity flies in the face of a more 
perverse reading of audit cultures as intentionally depersonalizing. This is not to argue 
that such cultures do not have depersonalizing effects. Rather, the point is that the logic 
of the intensive bureaucratic monitoring that is a feature of audit cultures is not simply 
‘one-size-fits-all’ in terms of the individuals who are its ‘products’. What is standard, 
however, is the particular model for measuring organizational performance. 
 
The standard models for measuring organizational performance are very much in 
evidence in the professional development of academics, which is increasingly focused on 
the nature of organizational work (ie, generic leadership and management skills) as 
distinct from disciplinary knowledge. The value of feedback, for example, through a 
variety of evaluation instruments, is undisputed in regimes of self management, in that 
the seeking of feedback has all the appearance of being both voluntary and natural, rather 
than being a key site of worker contestation (Adkins and Lury, 1999: 603).     
 
The introduction of audit mechanisms, whether as measurements of ‘teaching 
effectiveness’, or ‘research quality’, or  ‘accountability’, has been for some time now a 
feature of a wide range of public and private universities (Shore and Wright, 1999). 
Whether or not the appearance of these mechanisms heralds “a new form of coercive and 
authoritarian governmentality” (Shore and Wright, 1999: 1), the fact remains that  
managing the large and diverse student populations who are now engaging in university 
studies worldwide requires knowledge and activity that is outside the “unique, informal 
culture” (Ericson and Haggerty, 1997: 57) of academics’ traditional work. Thus the craft 
knowledge of academics is being reshaped by administrative interventions that work to 
achieve fair and efficient institutional practice.  It is not that academic knowledge is 
being displaced altogether. Rather it is being made over as ‘professional expertise’ 
through a process that Ericson and Haggerty (1997) describe thus:    
 
[P]rofessionals obviously have ‘know-how’, [but] their ‘know-how’ does not 
become expertise until it is plugged into an institutional communication system. It 
is through such systems that expert knowledge becomes standardized and robust 
enough to use in routine diagnosis, classification, and treatment decisions by 
professionals.  (p.104)  
 
The idea that academic work is being made the subject of “routine diagnosis, 
classification, and treatment decisions” is often viewed as a sinister, Orwellian 
development in higher education. However, the rush to resist this new regime often fails 
to acknowledge that teaching, as a sub-set of the organizational activities of universities, 
cannot exist outside risk management as “a system of regulatory measures intended to 
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shape who can take what risks and how” (Hood et al, 1992: 136). For better and worse, 
academics are being required to ‘plug in’ to audit technologies, those “supremely 
reflexive” practices through which the university can make sense of itself as an 
organization, can “perform being an organization through the act of self-description” 
(Strathern, 1997: 318).    
 
Categories of risk 
For organizations to become more visible to themselves (and thus more capable of self-
regulating self-audit), it is necessary that expert knowledge become standardised and 
routinised so that it can be used to diagnose, classify and treat potential dangers within 
the organization (Ericson and Haggerty, 1997). This has the effect of changing the focus 
of professional service from the client to information about the client. Put another way, 
the target of practice is no longer an individual student/client, but factors which have 
been deemed by institutional policy to be to be those most liable to produce risk to the 
organization. An effect of this, according to Robert Castel (1991), is the mutation of the 
practitioner-client relationship, so that the direct relation with the assisted subject that has 
characterized classical forms of treatment is transmuted into a relationship of 
practitioner-to-information. Castel elaborates:  
 
The essential component of intervention no longer takes the form of the direct face-
to-face relationship between the…professional and the client. It comes instead to 
reside in the establishing of flows of population based on the collation of a range of 
abstract factors deemed liable to produce risk in general….These items of 
information are then stockpiled processed and distributed along channels 
completely disconnected from those of professional practice, using in particular the 
medium of computerized data handling. (Castels, 1991: 281; 293, emphasis 
original)  
 
While Castel’s theorizing is focused on changing practices in the field of mental 
medicine and social work, there are, I suggest, clear parallels here with the changing 
nature of pedagogical work in ‘post-welfare’ higher education. Academics as pedagogical 
practitioners are required to pay increasing attention to the collation of a range of abstract 
factors that, when taken together, come to define a student/client as a case of (more or 
less) potential risk. As for medical organizations, new preventive polices in universities 
reconstruct clients, through statistical correlations of heterogeneous elements, as 
differentiated student population categories (part-time, off-campus, mature-aged, low 
SES, HDR, on-line), each demanding new modalities of intervention commensurate with 
the risks deemed to be associated with that population category.  
 
As indicated earlier, there has been in Australia recently much public and policy attention 
being given to the identification and management of a range of risks for higher education 
– the risk of failure, of waste, of declining academic standards. I want to focus briefly on 
the last in this list – declining standards – in terms of its capacity to generate information 
about particular ‘risky’ populations and to mobilize new modes of intervention by 
practitioners. As indicated earlier, when any publicly funded university is alleged by the 
media to have failed to manage the risk of ‘declining standards’, all public universities 
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are implicated in “perpetuating a fraud” (The Courier Mail, 3 February, 2001:1), and 
thereby abusing the public trust that is made tangible in government funding.  
 
Importantly, such media coverage serves not merely to target the activity but to identify 
some categories of client as ‘riskier’ than others in terms of the threat to standards. In 
Australia, an often reiterated connection is made between declining standards (‘soft 
marking’) and “exclusive, fee-paying overseas students” (The Courier Mail, 3 February, 
2001: 1). The allegation that “Students’ free ride Unis ‘favour fee-payers’” (Herald Sun, 
16 May, 2001: 29), and that this constitutes a  “dark side to export boom” (The Australian 
20 June, 2001: 34) in Australian higher education has spawned an outbreak of ‘tale-
telling’ about assessment practices on the part of students and academics, and a flurry of 
activity on the part of universities to show how responsive they are to any potential 
danger from assessment activities involving this ‘population’. (The University of New 
South Wales, for example, is reported as ensuring that the “enforcement of English 
language requirements for international students will be tightened’, having “toughened 
written English requirements last year” (The Australian, 6 June, 2001: 23)).  The risk to 
universities here is a double one - “exclusive, fee-paying overseas students” is a 
population category which comes to signify high risk not just in relation to standards but 
in terms of the potential loss of income for the university sector if this highly profitable 
client market is threatened.      
 
A number of other processes and activities get taken up as the amplification of the ‘soft 
marking’ danger progresses. ‘Softness’ becomes available to be seen as a more general 
malaise in universities, for example in admission programs as ‘soft entry’ (see “Med 
school in pay for entry deal”, The Courier Mail, 22 September 2000) and in curriculum 
design and delivery as ‘soft courses’ (see “Universities’ testing times”, The Advertiser, 10 
February, 2001: 67). In some cases, the ‘softness’ malaise is argued to be responsible for 
the failure of the international to serve the interests of Australia as a ‘knowledge nation’ 
(see “Dark side to export boom” (The Australian 20 June, 2001: 38).  The evidence 
provided for this in media reports is that the number of potential of international students 
doing postgraduate research degrees is falling and so too is the proportion of international 
students in doctoral and research masters programs (ibid, p.38). ‘Soft’ entry, and ‘soft’ 
courses for international students mean scant pay-off in knowledge production, so the 
argument goes.      
 
The issue of organizational ‘softness’ can and has been further extended to questions of 
workforce planning in universities. Allegations that student markers are mainly casual 
staff who are “untrained, undervalued, underpaid, unsupervised and in some cases, 
inexpert” (“Unis get poor marks for evaluation practices”, The Australian, 27 June, 2001: 
31), foreground dangers in casualisation as ‘soft staffing’. The article echoes Michael 
Gallagher’s critique (mentioned earlier) in identifying lack of uniformity in the 
organizational practices of universities as the culprit here:  
 
Casual marking staff range from young postgraduate students who [do] not possess 
the qualification in which they [are] marking, to retired professors with a wealth of 
knowledge and expertise, through industry practitioners with lots of experience in 
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the field but no educational background, and all stations in between. (The 
Australian, 27 June, 2001: 31) 
   
To be responsive to the danger of softness, with all that this implies about the quality of 
university as a self-managing organization, all university workers need to pay closer 
attention to, and actively engage with, the risk minimization policies and practices of the 
organization. This means they must all plug into and produce the flow of information that 
actively constitutes not only their clients but also themselves and their peers. Like their 
students/clients, academics are made available to be read as population categories 
through the information through which the university develops, measures and thus 
individualises performance. The crucial point is that the institutional priorities have 
served to shift academic attention from “unique, informal” relationships with actual 
students, peers and the self, to a more formal culture based on the relationship a worker 
has with the ‘expert’ information systems through which the performance records of 
students, peers and self are managed.    
 
Pedagogical subjects 
If teaching, as a ‘professional service’ of the (risk-conscious) university, is to focus on 
information about the student-as-client, then this has important implications for 
pedagogical subjects. Much has been made in progressive educational texts (eg, 
Goldstein, 1997; Noddings, 1984) of the centrality of the warm and caring teacher-
student relationship in pedagogical work. Indeed, the importance of having such a 
relationship is unquestioned in many contemporary texts on ‘effective teaching’ (see 
Abbot-Chapman and Hughes, 1991). Having come to accept the importance of ‘student-
centred’ teaching (in contrast with discipline- or teacher-centred pedagogy) (McWilliam, 
1999), academics are being required to enact that ‘student-centredness’ through a close 
relationship with the organizational record of the student as a performing subject. It is not 
that academics are to give up on liberal humanist versions of ‘good teaching’. What is 
important here is that academics remain wedded to the idea of ‘student/client-
centredness’ as a rationale for engaging closely with the individual work-in-progress case 
compiled by the university’s information managers (among whom they need to see 
themselves) and computer specialists. It is in this way that, as Castels (1991) argues, risk 
organizations reconstitute the practitioner-client (teacher-student) relationship, as one 
characterised neither by immediacy nor by the student as “the concrete subject of 
intervention” (p. 288). There is no requirement that an individual academic forego close 
personal relationships with students; however, such relationships must be carefully time 
managed in order not to distract from the real work of demonstrating accountability by 
way of minimizing risk and maximising quality in ways that are organizationally 
sanctioned and approved. Put bluntly, what really counts in the self-auditing university is 
the degree of intimacy an academic has with the record.  
 
Investment in the new relationship of expert-to-portfolio changes what an individual 
academic does as part of a normal working day. The self-managing academic is more 
informed about, more focused on, and more likely to contribute to, on-line information 
flow and the virtual information storage systems that exist within the university. They are 
more adept than their counterparts at finding and using the university’s systems, and 
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more likely to invest in the self-development workshop opportunities that are a hallmark 
of the self-managing organization.  
 
Self-development (sometimes understood as ‘lifelong learning’) marks the upward and 
forward trajectory of the ‘enterprising’ individual. Lash and Urry (1994) provide an 
interesting analysis of the way that the self-development imperative gets translated into 
intensified processes of aestheticization and emotionalization, processes that have 
become part of the work of (self) management in a performance culture. The proliferation 
of ‘professional development’ workshops is one feature of this highly individualising 
imperative at work to produce stylized identities for the enterprising workplace. These 
workshops are likely to offer generic skill development to be applied both to academic 
and non-academic staff. In my own university they include workshops on conflict 
resolution, team-building, health and safety, stress management and so on. Those 
academics who prefer to spend their time in traditional pedagogical spaces (lecture 
theatres, tutorial rooms, laboratories) engaging with their students in traditional ways in 
real time, are increasingly under pressure to engage more fully with the ‘self-
development’ agenda as well as with the constantly changing technological 
communication and information processes of the university.  
 
The power to apply pressure to academics to ‘self-develop’ is most successfully exercised 
not by senior managers but through client ‘feedback’ (ie, formal and informal student 
responses) that can point directly to any failure of an individual academic to deliver 
‘quality’ (on-time, technology-enhanced and delivered) services. It is worth noting that, 
in Australia, academic unions remain implacably opposed to any attempt to make public 
in the university any student feedback provided about the teaching performance of an 
individual academic. Senior managers may not, as part of the normal course of events, 
ask an academic to reveal the result of formal teaching evaluations.      
 
As Strathern (1997) avers, technology “comes with the friendliest of epithets” (p.317) in 
the audit culture – the more of it used in ways that the organisation approves, the better. 
Thus the self-managing academic demonstrates improved teaching performance by 
pointing to the use of more and newer ICTs.  (The converse is also true – a teacher is 
unlikely to prove enhanced performance without this claim.) The number of ‘hits’ on 
website can thus come to count as a measure of teaching effectiveness, just as the 
offering of subject content in multiple modes comes to count as a measure of the 
academic’s capacity to be responsive to student diversity.  
 
There is little doubt that academics have for some time now been sensing the creep - or 
indeed the gallop - of audit cultures into their offices and classrooms. This “pervasive 
emphasis on external audit and quality assessment, mirrored by systems of internal 
quality assurance and control” has been an unwelcome development in the working lives 
of academic teachers and researchers (Davis, 1999; Delamont, Atkinson and Parry, 1997; 
Kenway and Bullen, 2000; Shore and Wright, 1999). Indeed, it has been depicted as one 
of the major sources of stress for academics, who are themselves increasingly portrayed 
as a stressed out population of workers. In Australia, there has been a great deal of 
attention given recently to academics as a highly stressed population. According to Jill 
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Roe (2001), writing in a recent volume of Australian Universities’ Review, “enrolments 
have soared and stress is everywhere” (p.3). This claim is supported by the National 
Tertiary Education Union, who point to unprecedented levels of stress among academics 
brought on by “increased workload, and decreased job satisfaction” (Myton, 2002: 6). 
The problem of academic stress and burnout is commonly depicted as having a two-fold 
cause: the inadequate funding of universities in a ‘more-for-less’ government policy 
environment (Rodan, 2001); and, the unwillingness or inability of university managers to 
protect shrinking departments from the chill winds (economic, technological, 
administrative) that are disfiguring academics’ work and identity (Roe, 2001). 
 
In broad terms, the tenor of the ‘anti-audit’ argument is that the instruments of 
accountability used to define and improve quality in higher education impose models of 
organization that are incompatible with traditional academic work, particularly in the 
creative arts. Such arguments stress the “unbusiness-like nature” of academic endeavour, 
insisting that regulations for business practice are both “formulaic” and “shallow” as 
mechanisms for verifying academic labour (Davis, 1999: 7).      
 
While there is much that can be justified in such critiques of the ‘quality’ agenda as it is 
being experienced in universities, there is also a sense of forgotten history here. As 
Strathern (1997) points out, the assumption that the practices of audit culture originate 
with “the commercial world with its protocols of bookkeeping and calculations of 
resources” (p.308) refuses acknowledgement of the fact that commerce ‘imported’ these 
practices from education at an earlier time. She describes the ‘re-importation’ of these 
practices by education as “a beautiful example of cultural replication” in that  “values 
cross from one domain of cultural life to another and then, in altered form, back again” 
(p.308). So arguments about the “unbusiness-like nature” of academics’ work may well 
be in danger of overlooking the education-like nature of accountability in their rush to 
blame an alien outside force for the university’s “ruined” state (Readings, 1996). 
Moreover, arguments such as these run the risk of becoming tired reiterations of a David-
and-Goliath theme – the higher education sector-versus-the State, the good academic-
versus-the University, the artist-versus-the bureaucrat.   
 
It may be more useful to focus instead on “charming absurdities” (Hobart, 1993) that can 
result when audit meets academe. Strathern (1997) provides an example by noting the 
concerns expressed by a 1992 Academic Audit Report on the performance on Cambridge 
University. The Report upbraided the University for “not stating its ‘aims and 
objectives’; for its ‘informal and uncodified understanding about academic quality’ and 
for the fact that ‘the course and examination system does not lend itself to a tidy and 
straightforward procedure for programme design’” (p.311-312). As Strathern notes, 
contradiction, conflict and maverick conduct seem to be as important to intellectual life 
as they are anathema to the audit exercise. In the singular consensus logic of audit, 
discontinuity prevents the organisation from being visible to itself and others – in 
Strathern’s words, “the auditors could not see how Cambridge University worked” 
(p.312).    
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The logic here is that it is only possible to know that a university is performing its 
educative function properly if its workings are made visible on the brightly lit forensic 
table of audit. So too the work of individuals in the university is made visible to 
themselves and others, including those who provide the public funding for universities. It 
is no accident that government policy-makers increasingly evoke the public interest in 
their calls for more guarantees that universities are ‘performing’. Any residual 
monasticism that may still be lurking in sandstone corridors must be flushed out into the 
bright light of accountability – rendered visible to all, and most importantly to the 
academics who still have so much (self) work to do. Without this work, it is impossible to 
make all aspects of the academic self  available for (risk) management. 
 
Because the imperative of audit is to ‘tidy’ arbitrariness, whether useful to intellectual 
work or not, the audit culture has significant negative implications for those academics 
who seek a working life “of lonely splendour” in which “one …[is] able to come and go 
at one’s will’ (Tierney, 2001: 13). One of the most difficult issues for academics to 
address is that it is not possible for anyone to sit outside the performance culture and still 
be a valued player in a particular area of university activity. The option of ‘just teaching’ 
has been overtaken by the demands that all performance be accountable in terms of 
quality and that particular systems of communication and forms of documentation be 
engaged with for the distribution of performance-related knowledge. Likewise, the option 
of ‘just researching’ is sustainable only if the research is understood to be quantum-
generating, with all of the processes of documentation and self-scrutiny that this involves. 
 
What does it mean, then, to speak, as Tierney does, of “the organisation’s culture 
remain[ing] true to basic academic ideals”? Does it mean that managers should refuse 
“hyper-rational and deeply pragmatic” (Ericson and Haggerty, 1997) logic of risk 
minimization in favour of some other (less rational?) option? What would such an option 
look like as a workable system for managing universities? These questions are posed not 
to celebrate the effects of rationalities of risk on academics, nor to save academics from 
the pernicious effects of ‘managerialism’, but to invite serious engagement with the self-
auditing academic subject as a problem of the present. The imperative simply to defend a 
Cambridge-style castle of Academe against the philistine Audit is one which would 
hardly be seductive to those sociologists seeking better life-chances for the marginalized. 
What awkward new partnerships could such logic thrust upon what’s left of the Left!  
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